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Police officers, acting on information from a reliable
informant that an individual was selling narcotics from the back of
a certain car at a certain location, drove to the location, found the
automobile and the individual, and arrested Albert Ross.1 One of
the officers conducted a warrantless search of the trunk of the
automobile. 2 In a closed brown paper bag he found glassine bags
containing a white powder. 3 After driving the automobile back to
the police station, a second warrantless search of the trunk revealed
a zippered red leather pouch containing $3200 in cash. 4 Ross was
charged with possession of heroin with intent to distribute.5 The
trial court convicted Ross after it refused his motion to suppress the
evidence that was found in the warrantless searches. 6 The court of
1. United States v. Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 2160 (1982). The events took place on tile evening of
November 27, 1978. The infornmant, who had been previously reliable, telephoned l)etective
Marcum of the District of Columbia Police Department. He stated that he had watched an
individual known as the "Bandit" (Albert Ross) complete a narcotics sale froni the back of a maroon
Chevrolet Malibu near 439 Ridge Street in the District of Columbia. The informant further stated
that Ross told him that he had additional narcotics in the trunk. Id.
Detective Marcum, through a computer check, discovered that the car was registered to Albert
Ross, who fit the description of the informant and used the alias "Bandit." Detective Marcum,
Detective Cassidy, and Sergeant Gonzales went to the area described by the informant. After some
time they found Ross and the automobile and arrested him. Id.
2. Id. Detective Cassidy took Ross' keys and conducted the search. Id.
3. Id. The police laboratory later determined that the white powder was heroin. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id. Ross was charged with violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a). Id. Section 841(a) provides:
Except as authorized by this subchapter, it shall be unlawful for any person
knowingly or intentionally(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense or possess with intent to
manufacture, distribute or dispense, a controlled substance; or
(2) to create, distribute or dispense, or possess with intent to create,
distribute, or dispense, a counterfeit substance.
21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a) (West 1981).
Ross was also charged with possession of heroin, carrying a pistol without a license, and
possessing a firearm after a felony. United States v. Ross, 655 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 2160.
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appeals reversed, holding that neither of the containers found in the
trunk of the automobile should have been searched without a
warrant. 7 The United States Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals and held that when probable cause justifies the search of a
lawfully stopped vehicle, a police officer may conduct a warrantless
search of every part of the vehicle and its contents that is as
thorough as could be authorized by a magistrate.8 United States v.
Ross, 102 S. Ct. 2157 (1982).
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. 9 The
fourth amendment protection arises when an individual
demonstates an actual expectation of privacy in an object or activity
that society recognizes as reasonable. S When an individual
demonstrates a reasonable expectation of privacy in an object or
activity, the United States Supreme Court has held that a
warrantless search into that object or intrusion into that activity is
per se unreasonable, even though the search is based on probable
cause and is done in a reasonable manner. 1 The Supreme Court
7. Id. at 2160-61. A three judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that only the paper bag, and not the leather pouch, could be searched without a
warrant. The court reasoned that because Ross had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the leather
pouch, it could not be searched without a warrant. That same privacy interest could not be sustained
in a brown paper bag, however, and it could be searched without a warrant. Id. at 2160.
After rehearing the case en banc, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that neither container could be searched without a warrant. 655 F.2d at 1171.
8. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. The United States Supreme Court also held that the scope of the search isnot defined by the nature of the container in which the contraband is hidden, but is "defined by the
object of the search and the places where there is probable cause to believe it might be found." Id.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Id.
The North Dakota Constitution includes a similar passage, which provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons and things to be seized.
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8.

10. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan
gave the example of a home as a place where an individual has an actual expectation of privacy that
society recognizes as reasonable. Justice Harlan contrasted that with the ideas, objects, and activities
that an individual puts in plain view of society in which he cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy. Id.
11. Id. at 357. The Supreme Court in Katz stated that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment - subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Id.
In Katz the government electronically listened to and recorded the petitioner's phone
conversations from a public telephone booth. Id. at 348. The Court held that the petitioner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his phone conversations. The Court further held that although
the intrusion was based on probable cause and was completed in a reasonable manner, it violated the
fourth amendment warrant requirement. Id. at 356.
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however,
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requirement.

Under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement, a
police officer who lawfully stops an automobile may search it if he
3
has probable cause to believe it contains contraband.' The
14 justified a warrantless
Supreme Court in Carroll v. United States
search of an automobile because a "vehicle can be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
6
sought.' 1 5 The Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney' expanded
this rationale stating that a warrant is unnecessary to search an
automobile on the highway because "the car is moveable, the
occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never be found
again if a warrant must be obtained." 17 The automobile exception
12. See generally 2 W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 7 (1978 & Supp. 1982) (discussing
automobile searches and the warrant exceptions regarding them).
The Supreme Court established the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant
requirement in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). The Belton case involved the warrantless
search of an individual and the interior of the automobile in which he was riding. The Supreme
Court held that when a passenger ofan automobile is arrested, a police officer may search his person,
as well as the passenger compartment of the automobile in which he is riding. Id. at 460.
The Supreme Court discussed the warrant requirement exception for searches conducted with
the suspect's consent in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). Police officers stopped an
automobile for a traffic violation and searched it with the consent of the owner. The Supreme Court
held that when a search is based on consent, the State must demonstrate from the totality of the
surrounding circumstances that the consent was voluntary. Id. at 248-49.
The Supreme Court discussed the plain view warrant requirement exception in Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). When an arresting officer inadvertently comes within plain
view ofevidence that is not concealed, but is outside the area of the arrestee's immediate control, the
officer may seize it, as long as the evidence came into plain view in the course of an appropriately
limited search of the arrestee. Id. at 467-68. The seizure in Coolidge was inappropriate because the
officer did not come upon the evidence inadvertently, and he could have obtained a warrant. Id. at
472.
The Supreme Court discussed the automobile exception to the warrant requirement in
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970). The Court held that a police officer who lawfully stops
an automobile may conduct a warrantless search of the automobile if he has probable cause to believe
that it contains contraband. A warrant is unnecessary because of the mobility of the automobile and
the fear that the evidence will be lost if not immediately seized. Id. at 51.
The Supreme Court discussed the stop and frisk exception in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
The Court held that a police officer who has reason to believe that an individual is armed and is
contemplating a crime may stop the individual and make a reasonable search for weapons. Id. at 30.
The police officer's search of two people who he suspected were about to complete a robbery was not
a violation of the fourth amendment. Id.
The Supreme Court discussed the hot pursuit warrant requirement exception in Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Police officers pursued an armed robbery suspect into his home and,
with his wife's permission, searched the home. The Supreme Court held that since the officers were
in pursuit of a suspected armed felon, their warrantless entry and search was permitted. Id. at 298300.
13. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925).
14. 267 U.S. 132 (1925). In Carroll federal agents stopped known bootleggers, who were
traveling on a road frequently used by bootleggers. The officers conducted a warrantless search of the
vehicle that included ripping open the rumble seat in which contraband was found. Id. at 135-36.
15. Id. at 153.
16. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). In Chambers the police seized the automobile driven by one of four men
arrested for armed robbery. The police conducted a warrantless search of the car after it was taken to
the police station. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 43 (1970). The Court held that there was
"no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before presenting the probable
cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand carrying out an immediate search without a
warrant." Id. at 52.
17. Id. at51.
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to the warrant requirement is further justified because an
individual has a lesser expectation of privacy in his automobile
18
than he has in his home.
The United States Supreme Court did not specifically address
whether containers found during a search under the automobile
exception could be searched without benefit of a warrant until 1981
in Robbins v. California.19 Prior to Robbins the Supreme Court had
dealt twice with the search of containers found in an automobile,
but in each instance there was probable cause to search the
20
container, not the automobile.
In United States v. Chadwick2' federal agents were alerted that
certain individuals were arriving by train with a footlocker that
contained contraband. 22 The federal agents spotted the footlocker,
but they did not seize it immediately. 23 Rather, the agents waited
until after the suspects placed the footlocker in the trunk of a car
driven by Chadwick. 24 The federal agents took the footlocker to the
federal building where they searched it without a warrant. 25 The
Supreme Court stated that the defendants were entitled to the
protection of a warrant. 26 In doing so the Court rejected both of the
rationales for the automobile exception to the warrant requirement
as applied to containers. First, unlike a car, police officers easily
can control a footlocker while they obtain a warrant. 27 Second, an
individual has a greater expectation of privacy in a footlocker than
28
in an automobile.
18. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). The Court noted that the Supreme Court
has upheld warrantless automobile searches, even when there was no concern that the automobiles
might be moved, because of the diminished expectation of privacy inherent in an automobile. Id.
The Chadwick Court reasoned that "[olne has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor vehicle
because its function is transportation and it seldom serves as one's residence or as a repository of
personal effects." Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)).
19. 453 U.S. 420 (1981). In Robbins the Supreme Court held that the warrantless search of
containers found during a search under the automobile exception violated the fourth amendment.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 428-29 (1981).
20. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 755 (1979) (probable cause to search a green
suitcase); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 3 (1977) (probable cause to search a footlocker).
21. 433 U.S. 1 (1977).
22. Id. at 3. The agents in Boston, the location of the eventual arrest, received their information
liot leteral agents in San Diego, who were acting on a tip from railroad officials. Id.
23. Id. at 4. The agents first verified that the footlocker contained marijuana with a specially
trainedldog. Id.
24. Id. Chadwick came to pick up the suspects who had arrived on the train. Id.
25. Id. The footlocker, which was doublelocked and contained marijuana, was opened without
the consent of the defendants. Further, the government conceded that the police officers opened it at
a time when there was no risk oflosing the evidence and no risk of danger, and that the officers easily
could have stored the tbotlocker until a warrant was obtained. Id. at 4-5.
26. Id. at 15-16. The Chadwick Court stated that it could find no exigency to support the need for
a warrantless search. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 13. The bases fbr the automobile exception to the warrant requirement are that a car is
highly mobile and that evidence might be lost if the police must wait for a warrant to search. See
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51.
28. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 13. The Chadwick Court reasoned that unlike a car, the contents of
luggage are not open to public inspection. Luggage is more likely to be the repository of personal
effects. Id.
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The facts in Arkansas v. Sanders29 were similar to those in Chadwick. In finding the search unconstitutional, the Court reasoned
that the rationales that justify a warrantless automobile search were
not applicable to container searches.3 0 The Court in Sanders,
however, laid down a broader rule stating that "a warrant is
generally required before personal luggage can be searched and the
extent to which the Fourth Amendment applies to containers and
other parcels depends not at all upon whether they are seized from
an automobile." 31
As Chief Justice Burger noted in his concurring opinion in
Sanders,32 neither of the above cases were automobile exception
cases. 33 The key distinction, according to the Chief Justice, was
that there was probable cause to search the container, rather than
34
the automobile, in each case.
3 5 the police officers did complete a
In Robbins v. California
warrantless automobile exception search. 36 During the search the
officers opened a sealed container in which they found contraband.3 7 In a plurality opinion the Supreme Court held that the
warrantless search of the containers found during the lawful search
of the automobile violated the fourth amendment.3 8 The Robbins
plurality decision met with almost immediate resistance, 39 and the
need for clarification led the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in
40
UnitedStates v. Ross.
29. 442 U.S. 753 (1979). A Little Rock, Arkansas, police officer had information that Sanders
was arriving at the local airport with a green suitcase containing contraband. Locating Sanders at the
airport, the officer waited to seize the suitcase until it was placed in the trunk of a taxi. He searched
the suitcase on the scene before obtaining a warrant and found marijuana. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442
U.S. 753, 755 (1979).
30. Id. at 763-65. The Court stated that a suitcase, unlike an automobile, is not highly mobile.
Id. at 763-64. Also, a person has a higher expectation of privacy in a suitcase than he has in an
automobile. Id. at 764.
31. Id. at 764 n. 13. The implication of the rule was that a warrantless search of a container
found during an automobile exception search would always violate the fourth amendment. 102 S.
Ct. at 2167.
32. 442 U.S. at 766 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
33. Id. at 767.
34. Id. ChiefJustice Burger concluded that "[t]he relationship between the automobile and the
contraband was purely coincidental, as in Chadwick. The fact that the suitcase was resting in the
trunk of the automobile at the time of respondent's arrest does not turn this into an 'automobile'
exception case." Id.
35. 453 U.S. 420 (1981).
36. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 422 (1981). In Robbins probable cause existed to search
the automobile, which police officers stopped because it was being driven erratically, because the
officer smelled marijuana smoke emanating from it. Id.
37. Id. The containers included two packages wrapped in opaque plastic, each containing fifteen
pounds ofmarijuana. Id.
38. Id. at 428-29. Justice Stewart emphasized that the defendant exhibited a high expectation of
privacy in the contents of the packages because the contents were placed within a closed, opaque
container. Id. at 426.
39. See Virgin Islands v. Rasool, 657 F.2d 582, 590 (3d Cir. 1981). The court of appeals in
Rasool did not feel bound by Robbins because it was a plurality opinion without a single rationale. Id
Rasool involved the search of a paper bag taken during an automobile exception search. Id. at 585.
40. 102 S. Ct. at 2162.
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The Ross Court extensively analyzed Carroll v. United States.41
The Court concluded that Carrollestablished a limited exception to
the warrant requirement, under which a police officer with
probable cause to believe an automobile contained contraband
could conduct a warrantless search of that automobile. 42 Carrolldidnot establish, however, the scope of a search permitted under the
automobile exception to the warrant requirement. 43
The Ross Court noted that while the Court in Carroll did not
specifically comment on the permissible scope of the search, the
Carroll Court did not find the search to be unreasonable.4 4 The
scope of that search, which included ripping out the upholstery of a
seat, was "no greater than a magistrate could have authorized by
issuing a warrant. 45
The Ross Court then discussed a contemporary automobile
exception case, Chambers v. Maroney,46 and again noted that while
the ChambersCourt did not comment on the permissible scope of the
search, it did not find the search impermissible.4 7 The Ross Court
concluded, "It would be illogical to assume that the outcome of
Chambers-or the outcome of Carroll itself-would have been
different if the police had found the secreted contraband enclosed
within a secondary container and had opened that container
without a warrant. "48
The Ross Court then noted that a search done under a warrant
extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be
found. 4 9 When a warrant to search a vehicle is issued, it authorizes
a search of every part of the vehicle that might contain the object of
50
the search.
41. Id. at 2162-64. In Carrollprohibition agents searched, without a warrant, an automobile they
had stopped on the highway because they believed it to be carrying contraband. The agents found
nothing in plain view, but one of the agents noticed that the back of one seat was hard. When they
tore open the upholstery of the seat, the agents found 68 bottles of whiskey and gin. Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 136 (1925).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 2164. The Court also stated that a warrantless search of an automobile was not
unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 2169.
45. Id. The scope of the warrantless search was not unreasonable, according to the Ross Court,
because it could have been authorized by a warrant. Id.
46. 399 U.S. 42 (1977). In Chamberspolice officers seized and later searched, without the benefit
of a warrant, the automobile driven by four armed robbery suspects. Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 43 (1970).
47. 102 S. Ct. at 2169. In the search in Chambers police found the evidence in a concealed
compartment under the dashboard. Id.
48. Id. at 2169.
49. Id. at 2170.
50. Id. The Ross Court described the limits of a search as follows:
When a legitimate search is under way, and when its purpose and its limits have been
precisely defined, nice distinctions between closets, drawers, and containers, in the
case of a home, or between glove compartments, upholstered seats, trunks, and
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Further, the Court stated that the privacy interest that an
individual has in a container varies with the setting in which it is
found. 51 When the container is found within the confines of an
automobile, the individual's privacy expectation in the container is
not sufficient if there is probable cause to believe that the container
contains contraband. 52 The Court concluded that the privacy
interests of the individual must give way to the authority to search
in some instances. 53 When an automobile search based on probable
cause is conducted, the authority to search exists without prior approval of a magistrate.5 4 Therefore, "[t]he scope of a warrantless
search based on probable cause is no narrower-and no
broader-than the scope of a search authorized by a warrant
55
supported by probable cause." ,
There are some limits to the scope of an automobile exception
search. The search is limited by the nature of the object of the
search and the places in which that object can be found.5 6 The
Court pointed out that when police officers search without a
warrant on their own assessment of probable cause, the police
officers lose the protection from civil damages that a warrant gives
them if it is later determined that probable cause did not exist.5 7
The Court apparently was trying to indicate that the possibility of a
postsearch evaluation of probable cause could be a very real limit
on the number of warrantless automobile searches that the police
58
may conduct.
In its decision in Ross, the Court rejected the holding in
Robbins v. California59 and a portion of the reasoning in Arkansas v.
wrapped packages, in the case of a vehicle, must give way to the interest in the prompt
and efficient completion of the task at hand.
Id. at 2170-71.
51. Id. at 2171. The Court gave the example ofa traveler entering the United States. He does
not have a privacy right in his luggage that is protected by the lburth amendmtr. Id.
52. Id. The Court noted that the privacy interest in a container was certainly no greater than the
privacy interest in a glove compartment or trunk of a car, which could be searched. Id.
53. Id. at 2172. Fourth amendment analysis requires that a person's actual privacy interest be
first tested to see if it is reasonable and then balanced against the public policy reasons for not
protecting it in that particular instance. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967).
54. 102 S. Ct. at 2172.
55. Id. The Ross Court stated that the only difference between an automobile exception search
and a search authorized by a warrant is that in the former prior approval by a magistrate is waived.
Id.
56. Id. The Ross Court noted that probable cause to believe undocumented aliens were being
transported in a van would not justify a search of a suitcase in that van. A second example indicated
that if probable cause was attached to a specific container within the trunk of a vehicle, it would not
justify a search of the entire vehicle. Id.
57.Id. at 2172 n. 32.
58. Justice Marshall argued in his dissent that prior review of probable cause is necessary
because a postsearch review may easily be colored by the result of the search. Id. at 2174-75
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 2172. The Robbins Court held that the warrantless search ofa container fbund during
an automobile exception search violated the fourth amendment. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 428 (1981).
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Sanders.60 Justice Marshall in his dissent states that the Court's
decision should require that both Sanders and Chadwick be
overturned. 61 Justice Marshall's central concern with the holding
in Ross is that, in his view, it does away with the fourth amendment
warrant requirement when applied to automobiles. 62 According to
Justice Marshall, the purpose of the warrant requirement is to
assure that a neutral magistrate makes the determination of
whether probable cause exists. 63 Under Ross that decision is left
totally to the police officer.
Both the majority 64 and the dissent 65 agree that the decision
will have a major impact on law enforcement. The decision
expands the power of the police to conduct warrantless automobile
searches. When a police officer stops an automobile and has probable cause to believe that the automobile contains contraband,
he may conduct a search of every part of the automobile and any
container within it that could conceal that type of contraband. It
gives to the police officer in this situation power equal to that of a
60. 102 S. Ct. at 2172. Specifically, the Ross Court had to reject the language in Sanders that
indicated that the fourth amendment warrant requirement applied to containers and parcels
regardless of whether they were found in an automobile. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 764
n. 13 (1979).
61. 102 S. Ct. at 2180-81 (Marshall,J., dissenting). In his dissent,Justice Marshall stated:
[Tihe Court's attempt to distinguish the holdings in Chadwick and Sanders is not only
unpersuasive but appears to contradict the Court's own theory. The Court suggests
that in each case, the connection of the container to the vehicle was simply
coincidental, and notes that the police did not have probable cause to search the entire
vehicle. But the police assuredly did have probable cause to search the vehiclefor the
container. The Court states that the scope of the permitted warrantless search is
determined only by what a magistrate could authorize. . . . Once police found that
container, according to the Court's own rule, they should have been entitled to search
at least the container without a warrant. There was probable cause to search and the
car was mobile in each case.
Id. at 2181 n. 11.
62. Id. at 2173-74. Justice Marshall's view that the holding in Ross does away with the fourth
amendment warrant requirement when applied to automobiles is seemingly a fair assessment. Under
the automobile exception after Ross, a police officer makes both the determination of probable cause
and the determination of the scope of the search, subject only to sanctions after the fact. Id.
63. Id.Justice Marshall discussed the warrant requirement as follows:
"The warrant traditionally has represented an independent assurance that a search
and arrest will not proceed without probable cause to believe that a crime has been
committed and that the person or place named in the warrant is involved in the crime.
Thus, an issuing magistrate must meet two tests. He must be neutral and detached,
and he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists for the requested
arrest or search. This Court long has insisted that inferences of probable cause be
drawn by 'a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer
engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.' "
Id. at 2174 (quoting Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972), which cited Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
64. 102 S. Ct. at 2161-62. The Court indicated that the purpose of accepting Ross for hearing
was to clarify this area of the law that affected so many people. Id.
65. Id. at 2181 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the
decision will have a profound effect. He and the majority both noted that numerous vehicles are
stopped daily by police officers and that police officers often have probable cause to believe that a
stopped automobile contains contraband. Id.
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magistrate. It remains to be seen whether the police will abuse this
new authority.
North Dakota will in all likelihood follow the approach laid
down by the Supreme Court. North Dakota has a constitutional
search and seizure provision almost identical to the fourth
amendment.6 6 The North Dakota Supreme Court has stated that it
has the power to apply higher constitutional standards than are
required by the United States Constitution. 67 The North Dakota
Supreme Court has adopted the automobile exception to the
warrant requirement, 68 however, and has not adopted a higher
standard than mandated by the United States Constitution in any
automobile search case. 69 In light of this history, it seems likely that
the North Dakota Supreme Court will adhere to the holding in
Ross.

GEORGE A. KOECK

66. N.D. CONST. art. I, § 8. For the text of the constitutional provision, see supra note 8.
67. See State v. Matthews, 216 N.W.2d 90 (N.D. 1974) (the court stated in dicta that it has the
power to apply higher standards than those required by the United States Constitution).
68. E.g., State v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 328 (N.D. 1977) (officer who sees a defendant
simultaneously drinking beer and driving has probable cause to make a warrantless automobile
search).
69. See State v. Klevgaard, 306 N.W.2d 185 (N.D. 1981) (a warrantless search of an automobile
conducted after the arrest of the occupants for reckless driving was upheld due to exigent
circumstances of darkness and the automobile being on a public road); State v. Klodt, 298 N.W.2d
783 (N.D. 1980) (sheriff may conduct a warrantless inventory search of an abandoned vehicle before
taking it into custody); State v. Meadows, 260 N.W.2d 329 (N.D. 1977) (officer who sees a
defendant simultaneously drinking beer and driving has probable cause to make a warrantless
automobile search); State v. Stockert, 245 N.W.2d 266 (N.D. 1976) (a warrantless search of an
unoccupied vehicle on private property, not in police custody, not suspected of containing
contraband, not immediately mobile, and not suspected of containing anything dangerous to the
police was not authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement); State v.
Binns, 194 N.W.2d 756 (N.D. 1972) (probable cause to search an automobile without a warrant did
exist when police officers recognized the odor of marijuana smoke coming from the automobile).

